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Chapter 13
Harmonizing the Regulation
of Financial Advisers
Arthur B. Laby
Financial services professionals who advise individuals about securities,
such as stocks, bonds, or mutual funds, are generally either broker-dealers
or investment advisers, titles that have little meaning to ordinary investors
(RAND Report, 2008; SEC Staff, 2011b ; Hung and Yoong, 2013). Although
brokers and advisers historically provided distinct services, the roles they
serve today are often similar or nearly identical. Regulation, however, has
not kept pace with changes in the industry and brokers and advisers remain
subject to separate regulatory regimes. The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is now considering whether to harmonize the regula-
tion of broker-dealers and investment advisers and place a fiduciary duty on
brokers that give advice to retail customers. Under a fiduciary standard,
brokers would be subject to a higher duty of care applicable to investment
advisers. This chapter explores the debate over regulatory harmonization,
places it in historical context, and discusses recent developments shaping
its resolution.
We proceed by explaining how the debate over harmonization has
migrated from the SEC to the courts, to Congress, and back to the
SEC. First, we provide background information regarding harmonization,
followed by a review of the historical context of the regulation of brokers
and advisers, culminating in the SEC’s adoption of an ill-fated rule under
the Advisers Act to address harmonization-related concerns. Next, we
explain the legal challenge to the rule mounted by the Financial Planning
Association and the reasons the District of Columbia (DC) Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated the rule. Then we turn to Congressional action, summar-
izing how the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank Act) addressed regulatory harmonization and placed
ultimate responsibility for the issue back on the SEC’s shoulders. Subse-
quently, we discuss a 2011 SEC staff study mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act.
Finally, we identify challenges facing the SEC as it pursues a path of
harmonization.
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Individual investors planning for a child’s education, preparing for retire-
ment, or just managing short-term savings, face a dizzying array of financial
services providers eagerly seeking to gather more assets under their man-
agement. Banks, mutual funds, stockbrokers, investment advisers, insur-
ance brokers, and financial planners of different stripes offer a wide variety
of investment products and services, many of which are devilishly complex
and beyond the understanding of average investors. In some cases, the
roles performed by these service providers overlap. A financial planner who
trades securities for a client, for example, must also be a broker-dealer.
A securities salesman who also sells insurance policies is subject to the
insurance-licensing regime in the state where he does business.
Labels used by financial services providers tend to confound investors.
Many individuals and firms which call themselves ‘financial advisers’ may
not be considered ‘investment advisers’ under the law; instead, they are
regulated as broker-dealers. In addition, many brokers and advisers per-
form an identical function when they provide advice to individuals about
securities. Under a philosophy of functional regulation, service providers
performing the same role should be treated similarly. The federal securities
laws, however, contain separate regulatory schemes, one for brokers and
another for advisers, and the duties and obligations differ under each. This
result—same function but different regulation—appears nonsensical, par-
ticularly when most people pay little attention to whether the individual
sitting across the table recommending a stock or mutual fund is considered
a broker or an adviser under the law.
What are the key differences between broker-dealer and investment
adviser regulation? Brokers are regulated under a Depression-era law, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which defines brokers and dealers and
requires their registration with the SEC (Securities Exchange Act, 1934:
}15(a)). When providing advice to customers, brokers are subject to a
‘suitability’ standard; they must ensure that investments they recommend
are suitable to a customer’s investment needs (FINRA, 2012). The theory
behind the suitability rule is that when a broker recommends a security, he
is making an implied representation that the security is consistent with the
investor’s objectives and therefore a suitable investment (Hazen, 2009).
Investment advisers are financial services professionals devoted primarily
to rendering advice. Advisers are subject to the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, which regulates persons who meet the definition of ‘investment
adviser’ as defined by the Act. Under the Advisers Act, advisers are subject
to a higher ‘fiduciary’ standard of care (SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
1963: 191–2). According to a fiduciary standard, an adviser’s recommenda-
tion must not only be ‘suitable,’ it also must be in the client’s ‘best interest’
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(SEC v. Tambone, 2008: 146). The adviser’s best interest standard is analo-
gous to a fiduciary’s best interest standard in other areas, such as the law of
trust or guardianship, and the duty has been called the ‘highest known to
the law’ (Donovan v. Bierwirth, 1982: 272 n.8).
Over the last 15 years, the SEC has considered whether the bifurcated
system of regulation for brokers and advisers should be revisited. During
this period, regulators watched in disbelief as Bernard Madoff Investment
Securities, which as of 2005 was both an investment adviser registered with
the SEC and a broker-dealer registered with the SEC and the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), was exposed as a monumental
Ponzi scheme, emphasizing the importance of vigorous regulation of
financial services providers (Schapiro Statement, 2009). The courts and
Congress have inserted themselves into the harmonization debate, and the
Dodd-Frank Act required the SEC to further study the issue. The Act also
authorized the SEC to harmonize the law but did not require new rules
(Dodd-Frank, 2010: }913).
The decision regarding whether to harmonize regulation is critically
important for the legal duties imposed on broker-dealer and investment
adviser firms, as well as the hundreds of thousands of registered representa-
tives who work for them, many of whom provide advice to retail customers
(SEC Staff, 2011b). The decision also has important implications for brokers’
business model, which is dependent in certain respects on application of the
suitability standard as opposed to a fiduciary norm. Resolution of the debate
is also pertinent to regulation of fiduciaries by the US Department of Labor
(DOL) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA, 1974).
As discussed below, the DOL has proposed a new definition of fiduciary
under ERISA. Topics the SEC might address in new rules authorized by
Dodd-Frank could apply to ERISA fiduciaries as well (EBSA, 2010).
Securities and Exchange Commission regulation
Historical development
Broker-dealers and investment advisers first faced federal regulation in the
early part of the twentieth century when Congress enacted federal secur-
ities laws during the Great Depression. The Securities Act of 1933, a
seminal securities statute passed as part of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s First
Hundred Days, required companies offering and selling securities to the
public to register offerings with the government and provide detailed
disclosure to the purchaser about the issuer and the securities to be sold.
The Securities Act, however, did not regulate market professionals, such as
brokers or advisers, in any detail.
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Regulation of broker-dealers and the establishment of the SEC came one
year later in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Leading up to passage of
the Exchange Act, a bitter clash ensued between the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration and the brokerage community over matters such as margin require-
ments, limitations on broker’ activities, and the composition of the SEC
itself. In the end, the Act was a product of political compromise after
intensive lobbying not only by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), led
by the infamous but formidable Richard Whitney, but also by dozens of
local exchanges, which echoed Whitney’s concerns. After months of nego-
tiation, Congress passed the Exchange Act, which defined brokers and
dealers, placed restrictions on their activities, and required their registra-
tion with the newly created SEC (Parrish, 1970; Seligman, 2003).
In 1938, after a scandal ensnaring the NYSE’s Richard Whitney, Congress
passed the Maloney Act as an amendment to the Exchange Act. The
Maloney Act authorized the creation of the National Association of Secur-
ities Dealers (NASD) as a self-regulatory organization (SRO) for over-the-
counter brokers and dealers (Maloney Act, 1938). Although the NASD
played a salutary regulatory role, it also functioned as a powerful trade
association and often opposed the SEC’s initiatives (Seligman, 2003). The
NASD’s successor, FINRA, serves today as the SRO for broker-dealers,
imposing detailed regulation and registration obligations on broker-dealer
firms and their registered representatives. There are now approximately
5,100 broker-dealer firms and 600,000 registered representatives associated
with those firms (SEC Staff, 2011b).
A statute dedicated to the regulation of investment advisers did not
appear until 1940, when the last of the Depression-era securities laws
were enacted. On the eve of America’s entry into World War II, Congress
passed the Investment Company Act, a voluminous statute regulating
mutual funds. As Title 2 of the same bill, Congress passed the more modest
Investment Advisers Act regulating investment advisers. Unlike the
Exchange Act, the Advisers Act contained no reference to a self-regulatory
structure for advisers, and no SRO for advisers exists today, although the
topic is timely once again (SEC Staff, 2011a). The key provisions of the
Advisers Act were a registration section, requiring certain advisers to regis-
ter with the SEC, and an antifraud provision modeled after the Securities
Act, which prohibited defrauding advisory clients or potential clients
(Advisers Act, 1940: }}203, 206). SEC-registered investment advisers now
number approximately 11,000; another 15,000 advisers are regulated by
state authorities. There are approximately 275,000 investment adviser rep-
resentatives associated with advisory firms (SEC Staff, 2011b).1
The Advisers Act’s antifraud provision contained an important section
affecting the business models of investment advisers. The provision severely
restricted an adviser from engaging in principal transactions with advisory
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clients. A principal transaction occurs when an adviser, acting as a princi-
pal, buys securities from or sells securities to a client. Because principal
trading presents a conflict of interest with one’s client, the Advisers Act
prohibited an adviser from engaging in such trading unless the adviser
provided prior written disclosure to the client and obtained her consent on
a trade-by-trade basis. When Congress adopted this provision, it clarified
that the purpose was to reduce the chance that the adviser would dump a
‘sour issue’ on its own client (Schenker, 1940). Brokers faced no such
restriction in the Exchange Act.
Brokers, who often advise their brokerage customers about securities,
were excluded from coverage under the Advisers Act as long two conditions
were met. Under the first condition, the broker’s advice must be ‘solely
incidental to’ brokerage services. (The phrase ‘solely incidental’ was not
defined.) Under the second, the broker must receive no ‘special compen-
sation’ for providing advice (Advisers Act, 1940: }202(a)(11)(C)).
According to the Act’s legislative history, the term ‘special compensation’
was shorthand for non-commission-based compensation (S. Rep. 76-1775,
1940: 22). Thus, as long as a broker could meet those two conditions—
provide advice that is ‘solely incidental’ to brokerage and charge only
commissions—the broker could provide investment advice but steer clear
of regulation under the Advisers Act.
For decades, the division between brokers and advisers was fully func-
tional for both regulators and the regulated. Brokers differentiated them-
selves from advisers by charging commissions. They were regulated under
the Exchange Act and subject to a ‘suitability’ standard enforced by the
SEC and the NASD, now FINRA. By contrast, advisers typically charged
asset-based fees, such as 100 or 125 basis points, depending on the adviser,
the client, and the amount of assets in the account. Advisers were regulated
under the Advisers Act and subject to a stricter fiduciary standard of
conduct enforced by the SEC. Brokers and advisers seemed to understand
what the law required, depending on the type of account at issue, and the
law worked fairly effectively and efficiently.
This quiescent state of affairs was disrupted in the 1970s and 1980s when
the business model of established brokers came under attack. Deregulation
of fixed commissions in 1975 squeezed the profits of many broker-dealers
as discount brokers offered inexpensive execution options for customers
who did not want to pay for full service brokerage. In addition, financial
planning professionals began to offer comprehensive financial planning
services to brokerage customers who were interested in advice not only
about securities but also about other aspects of their financial lives, such as
preparing a will, purchasing insurance, investing in a home, or establishing
retirement or college savings accounts (Roper, 2011a). As indicated in
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Figure 13.1, the profitability of broker-dealers declined in the 30-year
period beginning in 1975.
Brokers responded to the pressure on profitability in several ways. In the
1980s, some began to offer financial planning services to brokerage cus-
tomers. In the 1990s, many brokers openly began to market themselves as
advisers, even calling themselves financial consultants or financial advisers
(Roper, 2011a). These brokers marketed their services based largely on
trusted advice as opposed to the sale of particular products or traditional
brokerage services such as trade execution, custody, recordkeeping, or
hypothecation services. Also in the 1990s, to compete with the discount
houses, some full service brokerage firms began to offer two tiers of ser-
vices, one for full service brokerage customers and another for execution-
only services (Gordon, 1999).
Finally, many brokers began to migrate from charging commission-based
fees to asset-based compensation (White and Ramsey, 1999). This
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Figure 13.1 Broker-dealers’ profit margins (%) from 1975 to 2005
Note: Profit margin defined as the profitability ratio calculated as net income divided by
revenues.
Source: SEC (1968–2006) (see Table 13.1).
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migration was a response, in part, to the publication of the Report of the
Tully Committee, led by Daniel P. Tully, then Chairman and CEO of
Merrill Lynch & Co. The Tully Committee, appointed to address the
negative aspects of ‘churning’ in customer accounts, concluded that
firms should base at least part of their compensation on the amount of
assets held in a customer’s account, regardless of whether any trading
occurs (Tully Report, 1995). An asset-based fee, however, can lead to
conflicts of interest as well. When charging an asset-based fee, the firm
may pay too little attention to a customer, who must pay the fee regardless
of effort expended by the firm, or the firm may fail to recommend that a
customer remove assets from an account for the purchase of a product,
such as life insurance, that would lower the amount of assets in the account
and result in a lower fee for the firm. Nevertheless, after issuance of the
Tully Report, many brokers began to charge asset-based fees not only
because those fees reduced the risk of churning but also because asset-
based fees ensured a constant stream of income for the firm.
The shift from brokers providing traditional brokerage services, such as
securities execution, to the provision and marketing of advice, cast doubt
on brokers’ reliance on the statutory exclusion in the Advisers Act dis-
cussed above. If a broker held himself out as a financial adviser, could
that broker maintain that his advice was still solely incidental to brokerage?
This apprehension was heightened for brokers who charged an asset-based
fee. As mentioned, charging any fee other than a commission could dis-
qualify a broker from relying on the exclusion. In addition, introduction of
a two-tier fee structure could trigger application of the Advisers Act because
regulators could attribute a portion of the higher tier compensation (the
difference between the two fees) to investment advice (SEC, 1999). Com-
pensation attributable to advice could be considered ‘special compensa-
tion’ under the Advisers Act, preventing application of the exclusion.
Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)-1
By the late 1990s, brokers grew concerned that, as a result of changing their
method of compensation, they would become subject to Advisers Act
regulation in addition to regulation already imposed under the Exchange
Act. In their effort to quell additional regulation, brokers made a policy
argument based on a philosophy of functionality. If their activities had not
changed, they reasoned, why should they become subject to an additional
layer of supervision merely by virtue of offering investors alternative fee
structures, particularly when regulators themselves encouraged brokers
to adopt those very fee structures to address the pernicious abuse of
churning (Gottlieb, 2005)? The SEC agreed in principle with this
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reasoning and, in 1999, proposed a rule that would allow brokers to charge
non-commission-based compensation and still avail themselves of the
brokers’ exclusion in the Advisers Act (SEC, 1999).
The proposed rule was entitled Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be
Investment Advisers. Under the rule, a broker-dealer who provided invest-
ment advice would be excluded from the definition of adviser, regardless of
how the broker was compensated, as long as three conditions were met.
First, the advice had to be solely incidental to brokerage services. This
condition reaffirmed the statutory condition discussed above. Second,
the advice had to be non-discretionary. Under this condition, the Commis-
sion was stating for the first time that discretionary advisory services could
no longer be considered ‘solely incidental to’ brokerage.2 Third, the
broker had to disclose to its customer that the account was a brokerage
account. The last condition was intended to put the customer on notice
that although s/he is receiving investment advice, the advice is coming
from a broker, not an adviser and, as a result, s/he is not entitled to the
statutory protections of the Advisers Act (SEC, 1999).
The Commission received over 1,700 comment letters on the proposal. As
expected, brokers generally supported the rule while advisers assailed the
initiative for harming investor protection, providing a marketing advantage
to brokers over advisers, promoting investor confusion regarding the law,
and sending mixed messages regarding functional regulation (Thompson,
2000). The advisers complained that the SEC failed to recognize that the
nature of brokers’ services changed sharply since 1940 when the Advisers Act
was first enacted, and that advice, far from being incidental to brokerage, was
now a critical component of brokers’ business activities (Thompson, 2000).
The SEC did not act on the rule proposal for several years. In 2004, the
Financial Planning Association (FPA), a membership organization for
personal financial planning professionals, filed a petition for review of
the 1999 proposal. One month later, the SEC reopened the comment
period on the proposal, noting that the FPA had raised additional com-
ments (SEC, 2004). In January 2005, the SEC re-proposed the rule in its
entirety, making few changes from the original (SEC, 2005a). Later in
2005, the SEC adopted the rule as final (SEC, 2005b).
When the SEC adopted the rule, it recognized that it did not address
some of the troublesome issues raised by the evolving nature of brokerage
services. Presaging the difficult debate to come, the Commission, in its
adopting release, instructed its staff to consider undertaking a detailed
study, which would include the issue of whether broker-dealers who pro-
vide investment advice should be subject to fiduciary obligations normally
imposed on advisers (SEC, 2005b). After the rule was passed, the FPA again
petitioned the court for review. The court consolidated the two petitions
and issued its decision in March 2007.
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Financial Planning Association v. SEC
In its lawsuit, the FPA argued that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority
in adopting Advisers Act rule 202(a)(11)-1 (Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC,
2007: 483). In adopting the rule, the SEC relied on exemptive authority
contained within the definition of investment adviser. This exemptive
authority permits the SEC to exclude from the statute ‘other persons not
within the intent’ of the statutory definition. The FPA argued that reliance
on this provision was erroneous because Congress, in 1940, identified else-
where in the statute the group of brokers it intended to exclude from the
statute, namely those brokers whose advice was solely incidental to brokerage
and who did not receive special compensation (i.e., non-commission com-
pensation). The exemptive provision, the FPA argued, was inserted to allow
the SEC to exclude a wholly different category of advisers from the Act; it was
not meant to broaden a category of advisers Congress already addressed in
another subsection (Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 2007: 487).
Under US administrative law, if the terms of a statute unambiguously
preclude an agency’s interpretation, the court must reject that interpret-
ation. If the terms are ambiguous, however, the court must defer to the
agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable (Chevron v. NRDC, 1984:
842–4). The DC Circuit Court agreed with the FPA that the exemptive
provision was unambiguous and rejected the SEC’s view. The court stated
that the category of brokers the SEC wished to exempt, namely brokers who
do charge ‘special compensation,’ were not other persons because the statute
already addressed brokers as a category of persons.
Moreover, the court ruled that the SEC’s proposed exclusion was not
consistent with the intent of the Advisers Act. The statute’s legislative
history did not support an exclusion broader than the statute itself (Finan-
cial Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 2007: 488–9). A Senate report explained that
brokers were excluded from the definition of adviser insofar as their advice
was solely incidental to brokerage and they only charged commissions
(S. Rep. 76-1775, 1940). Thus, by excluding brokers who charged other
forms of compensation, the SEC’s rule conflicted with the statute and
legislative history (Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 2007: 488). The court
granted the FPA’s petition and vacated the SEC’s rule (Financial Planning
Ass’n v. SEC, 2007: 493).
Judge Garland prepared a vigorous dissent, explaining that in addition
to the ambiguity inherent in the words ‘such other persons’ and ‘within the
intent of this paragraph,’ the exemptive authority contains a final clause:
‘as the Commission may designate by rules.’ This language authorizes the
SEC, Garland wrote, to determine the intent of the paragraph. Judge
Garland simply disagreed that the statute only allowed the SEC to exclude
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advisers other than those already addressed in the statute (Financial Plan-
ning Ass’n v. SEC, 2007: 495).
The dissent pointed out that the real ambiguity in the case is whether the
authority to exclude ‘other persons’ means persons other than broker-
dealers (the FPA’s view) or persons other than the particular broker-
dealers covered by the statute (the SEC’s view). For the same reasons that
Judge Garland found the terms of the exemptive provision ambiguous, he
found the SEC’s construction reasonable. There is nothing unreasonable
about interpreting the words ‘other persons’ to include persons not actu-
ally excluded in the definition itself (Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 2007:
498). Judge Garland then moved to the second step of the analysis under
administrative law, namely deciding whether the agency’s interpretation
was reasonable and he found that it was (Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC,
2007: 499–501).
The FPA also argued that the SEC failed to properly analyze the costs and
benefits of the proposed rule (FPA, 2007a). According to the FPA, when
counting benefits, the SEC took into consideration savings by brokers, who,
under the rule, could avoid investment adviser regulation. When counting
costs, however, the SEC failed to take into account costs that would be
imposed on certain investors, who, under the rule, would not receive the
benefits of the Advisers Act. In other words, if a benefit of the proposed
rule were the resources a broker would save by omitting certain disclosures
that were required under the Advisers Act, a concomitant cost of the
proposed rule must be the harm imposed on investors who do not receive
the disclosure. The SEC responded that it took into consideration costs
such as investor confusion and differences in obligations that would follow
from the rule (SEC, 2007). The FPA found this inadequate and repeated its
earlier attack in subsequent briefing on the issue (FPA, 2007b).
Because the court decided the case on statutory authority grounds, it did
not address the SEC’s cost–benefit analysis. Developments since 2007,
however, have placed examination of costs and benefits in the limelight,
and the question of costs may determine whether the SEC will once again
take up the mantle of harmonization. As discussed below, both industry
participants and regulators are now focused primarily on the costs and
benefits of additional rulemaking.
Congressional action
The court’s decision in the FPA case failed to end the debate over the
regulation of brokers and advisers; instead, it merely raised additional
questions. With the SEC’s rule now vacated by the court, lawyers and
their brokerage clients puzzled over how to treat fee-based brokerage
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accounts, which were arguably no longer subject to a valid exclusion and,
therefore, covered by the Advisers Act. Moreover, if fee-based brokerage
accounts must be treated as advisory accounts, did that mean brokers had
to follow the Advisers Act and the SEC rules adopted under the Act with
respect to those accounts? If that were the case, the business model of
broker-dealers, particularly the ability to enter into principal transactions
with customers, would be in question.
One year after the FPA case was decided, the RAND Institute for Civil
Justice released the SEC-sponsored study referenced in the release
adopting the ill-fated rule. A key finding of the RAND Report was that
survey respondents and focus group participants did not understand the
distinctions between investment advisers and broker-dealers. Investors
were confused by the titles these professionals use, the firms they work
with, and the services they offer (RAND Report, 2008).
In 2009, the Obama Administration raised the issue of the regulation of
brokers and advisers in a white paper on financial regulatory reform
entitled A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation.
The Administration wrote that, from an investor’s perspective, advisers and
brokers often provide identical services, yet they are regulated under
different statutory frameworks (Treasury, 2009). Echoing the RAND
Report, Treasury stated that investors are often confused about the differ-
ences between advisers and brokers. Treasury noted that brokers often
provide investment advice to clients, and clients may rely on a trusted
relationship with their broker. Nevertheless, the fiduciary responsibilities
of advisers are not imposed on brokers. As a result, the Administration’s
position in 2009 was that new legislation should require broker-dealers who
provide advice to have the same fiduciary duties as advisers.
The Obama Administration’s approach to the problem was the reverse of
the SEC’s approach ten years earlier. In 1999, the SEC was inclined to
liberalize the rules governing broker-dealers, broadening the scope of the
brokers’ exclusion in the Advisers Act, thereby making it easier for brokers
to market and sell their advisory services without adhering to rules placed
on investment advisers. By contrast, the Administration sought to tighten
the rules governing brokers and treat brokers who provide advice more like
investment advisers.
In that spirit, draft legislation prepared by the Senate Banking Commit-
tee took an aggressive position that did not prevail in the final bill. The
draft language would have struck the broker-dealer exclusion in the
Advisers Act in its entirety (Senate Banking Committee, 2009: }913).
Under that approach, brokers who give advice would be subject to all
regulations imposed on advisers, including the restrictions on principal
trading discussed above. Such restrictions imposed on broker-dealers
would jeopardize brokers’ business model (Laby, 2010). Brokers often
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sell securities from their own accounts to customers, and they also buy
securities for their own accounts from customers, either as a market maker
in particular securities or as a market participant seeking to generate
trading profits. Engaging in this trading activity is the very definition of
dealer in the Exchange Act (Exchange Act, 1934: }3(a)(5)).
Resolving the issue of principal trading is one of the great difficulties in
finding a way forward in achieving harmonization. On the one hand, any
broker-dealer who provides advice should be required to act in the best
interest of the client to whom the advice is given. On the other hand,
imposing a fiduciary duty on dealers is inconsistent, or not completely
consistent, with the dealer’s role. A dealer’s profit is earned to the detri-
ment of his trading partner, the very person to whom the dealer would owe
a fiduciary obligation. As Norman Poser and James Fanto have explained,
when acting as a dealer and selling securities as principal, a broker-dealer
firm may be tempted to purchase the securities for a customer’s account at
a price unduly favorable to the firm; or, when acting as a market maker, the
firm may be tempted to unduly pressure a customer to buy securities in
which the market maker has a position he would like to dispose of (Poser
and Fanto, 2010). Perhaps the real problem is that firms are permitted to
act as both brokers and dealers. If this role was split, a fiduciary duty could
be imposed on brokers, who would act as agents for buyers and sellers,
giving them advice and facilitating the purchase and sale of securities, but
not on dealers, who would be permitted to trade with customers for the
dealers’ own accounts but refrain from providing advice.
In a largely forgotten chapter of the history of securities regulation, this
very idea—segregating the roles of brokers and dealers—was discussed,
debated, and ultimately abandoned during the dismal days of the Great
Depression. When the Securities Exchange Act was debated in Congress,
an initial bill included a provision prohibiting brokers from acting as
dealers (H.R. 7852, 1934). John T. Flynn, a leading reformer at the time
and member of the Senate Banking Committee staff, advocated this pos-
ition in The New Republic: ‘I lay it down as a truism that no man whose
primary function is a fiduciary one—that of an agent—should be permitted
to enter the market in which he appears as an agent for others and to trade
in that market for himself ’ (Flynn, 1936). Proponents of segregation,
however, could not overcome industry opposition. Congress struck the
provision prohibiting brokers from acting as dealers and instructed the
SEC to study the issue (S. Rep. No. 73–-1455, 1934). Dealers, however, were
not permitted to charge any price they could get away with; charging prices
substantially apart from market prices was considered unreasonable and
deemed illegal (Duker and Duker, 1939).
The conundrum of how to apply a fiduciary obligation to a dealer which
trades with customers out of its own account continues to bedevil Congress
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and the SEC nearly eighty years later. In a legislative maneuver that paral-
lels Congress’ actions in 1934, Congress in 2010 similarly struck the draft
provision of Dodd-Frank that would have eliminated the broker-dealer
exclusion and which would have imposed a fiduciary duty on broker-
dealers who give advice. Instead, as in 1934, Congress required the SEC
to study the effectiveness of the existing standard of care for brokers,
dealers, and investment advisers when providing advice (Dodd-Frank,
2010: }913(b)).
In addition to requiring a study, Congress authorized, but did not
require, the SEC to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers who give advice.
In Section 913 of Dodd-Frank, Congress included two rulemaking provi-
sions. Section 913(f) authorizes the SEC to adopt a rule to ‘address’ the
legal standards imposed on brokers and advisers when providing advice. In
adopting rules under this section, the SEC must consider the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the required study. This provision
is quite general. The term ‘address’ is not defined and is arguably limited
by existing federal securities laws. This provision does not explicitly hand
the SEC the authority to raise the standard of care applicable to broker-
dealers (Dodd-Frank, 2010).
The other provision, Section 913(g), is more specific. First, the subsec-
tion is entitled, ‘Authority to Establish a Fiduciary Duty for Brokers and
Dealers.’ Second, the subsection amends both the Exchange Act and the
Advisers Act to state that the SEC may adopt rules providing that the
standard of conduct for brokers and advisers when providing personalized
investment advice about securities to retail customers shall be to act in the
best interest of the customer—a fiduciary standard. Subsection (g) also
provides that the standard of conduct, if adopted, shall be ‘no less strin-
gent’ than the standard currently applicable to advisers under Section 206
(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act. It is well accepted that the
standard applicable under Section 206(1) and (2) is a fiduciary standard
(Laby, 2010).3
The SEC study on harmonization
The SEC staff published the study required by Dodd-Frank in January
2011.4 The study contained two principal recommendations, one
regarding a uniform fiduciary standard and one regarding regulatory
harmonization. As to the first, the staff recommended that the Commission
consider adopting a new rule to apply a fiduciary standard uniformly to
broker-dealers and investment advisers when they provide personalized
investment advice about securities to retail customers. Tracking the lan-
guage of Section 913 of Dodd-Frank, the staff recommended that the
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fiduciary standard be no less stringent than the standard currently applied
to investment advisers under Section 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act.
According to the SEC staff, the standard of conduct for brokers, dealers,
and investment advisers should be to act in the ‘best interest’ of the
customer, without regard to the interests of the broker, dealer, or adviser.
The staff placed responsibility for ironing out the thorny details of
implementing a fiduciary standard back on the Commission itself.
According to the study, for example, the Commission must ultimately
address how broker-dealers should fulfill their fiduciary obligation when
engaging in principal trading (SEC Staff, 2011b). But such details of imple-
mentation are the heart of the problem. Most observers would likely agree
that broker-dealers who give advice should owe a fiduciary duty to custom-
ers. There is far less agreement over how to implement this change.
Similarly, the staff postponed the difficult question of how to handle
conflicts of interest. Should SEC rules prohibit conflicts, require firms to
mitigate them, or impose disclosure and consent requirements? (SEC Staff,
2011b). Much like Congress declined to tackle the substantive issues and
placed responsibility for deciding them on the SEC, the SEC shifted
responsibility to its staff to address in the study, then the staff moved
responsibility back to the Commission itself. It is no wonder that commen-
tators have used the phrase ‘hot potato’ to describe the manner in which
harmonization has been addressed inside the beltway in Washington
(Green, 2011).
As to the second recommendation, harmonization of regulation, the
staff suggested several areas where the regulation of brokers and advisers
differs and could be brought into accord. Those topics include advertise-
ments, use of solicitors, supervision, licensing and registration, and main-
tenance of books and records.
The future of harmonization
The future of regulatory harmonization for brokers and advisers will turn
on choices and compromises largely unforeseen in 1999 when the SEC first
proposed its rule to address fee-based brokerage accounts. The regulatory
environment has evolved since the late 1990s. Since that time, investors
have witnessed the bursting of the internet bubble in 2000, colossal cor-
porate scandals in 2001 and 2002 such as the failures of Enron and World-
Com, the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Bernard Madoff
Ponzi scheme uncovered in 2008, the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, and,
most recently, passage of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. The composition of
the Commission has changed as well. Three SEC Chairmen have served
between the tenure of Arthur Levitt, who was Chairman in 1999, and the
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confirmation of Chairman Mary L. Schapiro in 2009. No commissioner
governing in 1999 serves today. Thus, the context in which regulators are
addressing harmonization is very different from the context in which the
SEC’s rule was first proposed.
Priorities are different too. In order to gain an understanding of how
harmonization might be resolved, one must examine new pressures bear-
ing on the dispute. As a result, we now review three developments essential
to understanding the debate over harmonization today. Each of these
issues weighs on regulators as they attempt to fashion a solution that is
the best for investors and for the markets. The issues are (a) whether
regulators can quantify the costs of any new rule and satisfy demands for
a robust economic analysis; (b) whether multiple regulators can work
together to find consistent solutions; and (c) whether Congress should
authorize an SRO for investment advisers akin to FINRA, the SRO for
broker-dealers.
Economic justification
The fate of regulatory harmonization for brokers and advisers will likely
turn on whether the SEC can justify the initiative in terms of costs and
benefits. In their statement regarding the staff study, Commissioners Kath-
leen L. Casey and Troy A. Paredes criticized the outcome based on an
insufficient analysis of the costs and benefits of imposing a uniform fidu-
ciary duty (Casey and Paredes, 2011). They explained that the study failed
to identify whether investors are harmed under one regulatory scheme as
opposed to the other and accordingly, the staff lacked a basis to conclude
that a uniform fiduciary standard would enhance investor protection.
Casey and Paredes also called for an analytical and empirical foundation
before rewriting the rules governing brokers and advisers. As possible areas
of further research, they recommended analyzing investor returns under
the two existing regimes, comparing security selections of brokers and
advisers, surveying investors, and considering evidence regarding the abil-
ity of investors to bring legal claims. The statement by Casey and Paredes
was published contemporaneously with the study in January 2011.
In April 2011, the views of Casey and Paredes regarding the necessity of
economic analysis were corroborated and validated by a decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, entitled Business Round-
table v. SEC (Business Roundtable v. SEC, 2011). In that case, the court
overturned Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-11, a controversial SEC
rule, which required public companies to provide shareholders with infor-
mation about their ability to vote for shareholder-nominated candidates
for a board of directors. The basis for the court’s decision was the
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Commission’s failure to adequately consider the rule’s effect on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation, which is required under the law. When
the SEC adopted the rule, Commissioners Casey and Paredes dissented,
faulting the SEC for failing to act on the basis of empirical data (Casey,
2010; Paredes, 2010).
In the Business Roundtable case, the court punctuated its prose with
unblunted criticism of the agency. According to the court, the SEC failed
‘once again’ to assess the economic effects of a new rule—citing two other
examples over the last several years when the same court struck down SEC
rules on similar grounds. The court charged the SEC with ‘inconsistently
and opportunistically’ framing the costs and benefits of the rule, with
contradicting itself, and with failing to respond to problems raised by
commenters (Business Roundtable v. SEC, 2011: 7). At one point, the court
described an SEC argument regarding use of the rule by mutual funds as an
‘unutterably mindless reason’ for applying the rule to mutual funds (Busi-
ness Roundtable v. SEC, 2011: 21).
The statements by Commissioners Casey and Paredes regarding the
proxy access rule, married with the court’s decision in the Business Round-
table case, now form the backdrop on which the regulatory harmonization
initiative is being sketched. Although the January 2011 statement by Casey
and Paredes regarding the SEC’s harmonization study predated the Busi-
ness Roundtable decision, once the decision was handed down, all eyes
turned to these two commissioners as authoritative regarding the requisite
economic analysis for a new SEC rule to withstand scrutiny by the courts. It
did not take long for one member of Congress to connect the Business
Roundtable case with the SEC’s harmonization initiative. In a statement
delivered at a Congressional hearing examining regulatory oversight of
brokers and dealers, Representative Scott Garrett, Chairman of the Finan-
cial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Spon-
sored Enterprises, referred to the SEC’s loss on the proxy access rule. He
then stated that until the SEC comes forward with a reason, backed up by
data, that a uniform fiduciary standard is necessary, the rulemaking should
not be under consideration (Garrett, 2011).
The SEC appears to be listening. In a letter to Representative Garrett,
SEC Chairman Schapiro described steps the SEC staff is taking to under-
stand available data and evidence as it relates to possible new rules
governing brokers and advisers (Schapiro, 2012). Chairman Schapiro rec-
ognized the importance of gathering additional data and empirical analy-
sis. She wrote that SEC staff economists were preparing a public request for
information to obtain data regarding the market for retail financial advice
and regulatory alternatives.
The controversy over the need for an economic analysis of any proposed
rule and the ability to perform one is itself becoming politicized. Advocates
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of a unified fiduciary duty urged members of Congress not to get side-
tracked by demands for an extensive economic justification before moving
forward. In May 2011, the Consumer Federation of America, a long-time
supporter of a unified fiduciary standard, wrote to key members of the
House of Representatives asking that a few industry members intent on
maintaining the status quo not be allowed to derail a process to provide
needed protections to middle-income investors (Roper, 2011b). Notwith-
standing these statements, there is little doubt based on recent develop-
ments, in particular the Business Roundtable decision, that the SEC is
unlikely to propose a rule to harmonize the regulation of brokers and
advisers absent sufficient economic analysis and data demonstrating that
the benefits justify the costs or, at a minimum, that the relevant data are
unavailable to make that determination.
Retirement plan advisers
In addition to the call for more robust empirical data and economic
analysis before the adoption of a fiduciary standard, another development,
which could affect any possible SEC rule, is the initiative by the DOL to
redefine the term ‘fiduciary’ for purposes of ERISA (EBSA, 2010). The
DOL has overlapping jurisdiction with the SEC because the DOL, under
ERISA, regulates advice by financial services professionals to employee
benefit plans, participants, and beneficiaries, with respect to plans spon-
sored by private-sector employers. The debate over the SEC’s harmoniza-
tion initiative parallels an equally vigorous debate over the DOL’s initiative
to redefine fiduciary as it relates to retirement accounts. Since a key aim of
Section 913 of Dodd-Frank is to produce a unified standard governing
those who provide individualized investment advice, it is ironic that
another agency, the DOL, has proposed to expand the category of persons
to whom the ERISA fiduciary standard would apply, including many of the
same persons and firms subject to SEC regulation.
The current rule-defining fiduciary under ERISA was adopted in 1975.
The rule established a five-part test for determining when an ERISA service
provider becomes a fiduciary by virtue of providing advice to an ERISA
plan. The five-part test for an adviser without discretionary control contains
the following elements: the service provider must (a) render advice, (b) on
a regular basis, (c) pursuant to mutual agreement, (d) where the advice will
serve as the primary basis for investment decisions concerning plan assets,
and (e) where the advice will be individualized pursuant to the particular
needs of the plan (DOL, 2012). The DOL’s proposal is intended to adapt
the five-part test to current market conditions.
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Under the proposed new definition, a service provider generally would
become a fiduciary if it rendered investment advice for compensation,
whether directly or indirectly, with respect to any plan assets and met one
of four additional criteria (EBSA, 2010). The new rule would clarify that the
term ‘advice’ would cover advice to a plan as well as to a plan beneficiary or
participant (EBSA, 2010). As a result of the proposed changes, the defin-
ition would likely apply to many brokers and advisers who offer advice to
clients holding Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). The definition is
broader than the current rule in other respects as well. It requires neither
that advice be provided on a regular basis nor that the parties have a mutual
agreement that the advice will serve as a primary basis for the plan’s invest-
ment decisions. These two criteria have kept the current definition narrow
(EBSA, 2010).
Industry representatives are concerned about the divergent tracks
followed by the SEC and the DOL. One set of concerns is practical. The
DOL’s definition of adviser is broader than the Advisers Act definition. It
includes a person who provides an appraisal or a fairness opinion concern-
ing the value of securities or other property, which is generally not covered
in the Advisers Act (EBSA, 2010). Moreover, an SEC rule governing har-
monization would affect services offered by ERISA fiduciaries, such as
proprietary trading, compensation, and sales of proprietary products
(Financial Services Roundtable, 2011).
Another set of concerns is structural. The SEC and the DOL approach
fiduciary norms from different perspectives. According to the SEC,
disclosure is often sufficient to address a conflict of interest. The US
Supreme Court has written that the Advisers Act reflects a Congressional
recognition to eliminate ‘or at least to expose’ an adviser’s conflicts of
interest (SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 1963: 191). By con-
trast, the DOL appears to be expanding the definition of fiduciary and
prohibiting certain compensatory practices (Financial Services Round-
table, 2011). Without agreement between the agencies, the SEC might
permit conduct, if disclosed, that would be prohibited by the
DOL. Some have argued that this difference in approach demonstrates
the necessity for agreement or coordination (Financial Services Round-
table, 2011).
Dissatisfaction with the DOL’s proposed rule prompted leading industry
groups, including the American Bankers Association, the Financial Services
Roundtable, and the Investment Company Institute, to ask members of
Congress to urge the DOL to re-propose the rule and explain how it would
be implemented in conjunction with a new SEC fiduciary standard (Ameri-
can Bankers Association, 2011).5 Shortly after this request was sent, the
DOL announced it would withdraw and re-propose the rule. Although the
DOL had received significant input in the form of comment letters,
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hearings, and individual meetings, it stated that it could benefit from
additional views (EBSA, 2011). Supporters of the DOL initiative predict
that the DOL will not flag regarding this initiative and will propose and
adopt an ambitious new rule (Toonkel and Barlyn, 2012).
Those who oppose a broad DOL rule raise cost considerations similar
to concerns raised with regard to an SEC rule. A letter to DOL Secretary
Solis from 53 members of Congress thanked the DOL for withdrawing
the proposed rule and urged it to ‘avoid costly new regulations that may
reduce choice among qualified service providers and investment products’
(Biggert, 2011). Similarly, the President of the National Association of
Insurance and Financial Advisors (NAIFA) stated that the DOL should be
‘wary of imposing an overly rigid fiduciary rule with unintended conse-
quences that would raise costs and reduce access to advice for millions of
middle class retirement savers’ (Miller, 2011). To address cost consider-
ations, the DOL has requested data from firms that would be affected by a
new fiduciary standard. Industry groups, however, responded that they
were unable to provide certain data due to confidentiality concerns, that
the data would be costly to provide, and that the request was too broad. The
requested data, they said, would not be useful in any case (Bleier et al.,
2012). Barbara Roper of the Consumer Federation of America raised the
temperature of the debate, asserting that the industry’s opposition is
ideological and not fact driven (Schoeff, 2012).
Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Director of the DOL’s Employee Benefits Security
Administration (EBSA), has stated that the laws must be updated to protect
workers and retirees and that the new fiduciary standard must cover
defined contribution plans such as 401(k) plans (Postal, 2012). The
DOL, therefore, appears poised to pursue new rules to redefine ‘fiduciary.’
At the same time, the DOL is well aware of the SEC’s initiatives. Regulators
recognize the importance of information sharing and cooperation. When
different regulators issue inconsistent positions, it can be just as frustrating
for the regulators as it is for the regulated firms, since regulated entities
often turn back to the regulators for relief or other assistance when the
firms believe they are caught between inconsistent guidelines. Thus,
although cooperation might slow the initiatives by both agencies, cooper-
ation is likely to be an important theme before rules by the DOL or the SEC
are finalized.
An SRO for investment advisers
In addition to the SEC and the DOL, another organization responsible for
regulating investment professionals is FINRA, the SRO for broker-dealers.
FINRA, however, does not regulate investment advisers. As discussed, in
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/9/2013, SPi
Harmonizing the Regulation of Financial Advisers 293
1938, the Maloney Act amended the Exchange Act and authorized an SRO
for brokers. The Advisers Act, passed just two years later, contained no
parallel provision authorizing an SRO for advisers. Whether to place a
fiduciary duty on brokers who provide advice is tied closely to an ongoing
debate over whether to create an SRO for investment advisers. The SRO
question has plagued the SEC for nearly 50 years and Congress once again
raised the issue in Dodd-Frank.
In 1963, the SEC’s Special Study of the Securities Markets recommended
an SRO for advisers (SEC, 1963). The Study concluded that an SRO could
‘formulate standards and educate the industry to a higher ethical plane,’
and that an SRO would be ‘highly desirable.’ The Study’s recommendation
was that registered advisers, other than brokers, should be organized into
an official SRO, which would adopt and enforce substantive rules. Alterna-
tively, the Study concluded that the SEC should strengthen its direct
regulation of advisers (SEC, 1963).
In 1989, due to growth in the adviser population, the SEC again pro-
posed that Congress provide for the establishment of an SRO (Tittsworth,
2009). Then in 2008, in its blueprint for financial regulatory reform, the
Treasury Department echoed these concerns stating that self-regulation by
advisers would enhance investor protection and bemore efficient than SEC
oversight. Treasury recommended that advisers be subject to a self-regula-
tory scheme similar to the one for broker-dealers (Treasury, 2008). None of
these recommendations has resulted in new legislation and the regulatory
model has remained unchanged. Brokers are regulated and examined
primarily by the NASD, now FINRA, as well as by the SEC; advisers are
regulated by the SEC only.6
As the number of advisers has continued to grow, some have questioned
whether the SEC is up to the task of adviser regulation, including under-
taking inspections and examinations (Karmel, 2011). There are approxi-
mately 11,000 advisers registered with the SEC, although investor assets are
highly concentrated in the top 1 percent of firms (Tittsworth, 2009).7 This
large number of advisers, in light of the relatively meager resources given to
the SEC staff, means that advisers rarely undergo examination. In 2011,
only 9 percent of registrants were subject to an SEC examination and,
on average, SEC-registered advisers are examined once every 11 years.
Because this situation appeared untenable, the Dodd-Frank Act required
the SEC to address an SRO for advisers in a study, which was completed in
January 2011.8
The study authors approached the issue in terms of resources and
proposed three alternatives: (a) authorize the SEC to impose user fees on
SEC-registered advisers to fund examinations, (b) authorize one or more
SROs to examine SEC-registered advisers, or (c) authorize FINRA to exam-
ine dual registrants for compliance with the Advisers Act (SEC Staff,
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2011a). Presumably each alternative would require legislation. Consistent
with the second alternative, House Financial Services Committee Chair-
man Spencer Bachus prepared draft legislation that would allow for one or
more groups to act as an SRO for advisers.
There is acute disagreement over establishing an SRO for advisers.
Advocates point to additional resources for examinations and oversight;
consistency between broker and adviser regulation; eliminating the redun-
dancy of two regulatory bodies (FINRA and the SEC) overseeing brokers
and advisers, especially a broker and adviser housed under one roof; and
an SRO’s ability to carry out prudential tasks, such as conducting inspec-
tions and examinations, because of a less adversarial relationship between
FINRA and the brokerage industry (Ketchum, 2009; Karmel, 2011). Those
in opposition point to an extra layer of bureaucracy and cost; conflicts of
interest due to industry funding and influence; questions regarding the
quality of SRO transparency, accountability, and oversight; historical dif-
ferences between brokerage and advisory firms; and lack of fit between an
SRO model of command-and-control regulation and a diverse adviser
community with multifarious business models and a heterogeneous client
base (Tittsworth, 2009).
If there is to be an SRO for advisers, FINRA is vying for the job. FINRA
maintains it is ‘uniquely positioned’ to build a strong oversight program for
advisers (Ketchum, 2009). Supporters argue this would be efficient because
88 percent of advisers are affiliated with a broker-dealer already overseen by
FINRA. The adviser community strongly disagrees that FINRA should be its
SRO. In a recent survey, 80 percent of advisers preferred SEC regulation to
a FINRA-type SRO for advisers; this preference remained strong even when
the cost of SEC oversight exceeded the cost of FINRA oversight (Boston
Consulting Group, 2011). Advisers assert that there is a risk, based on
FINRA’s own statements, that FINRA would attempt simply to export its
regulatory structure governing brokers to the world of investment advisers,
ignoring the practices and culture of the advisory profession (Tittsworth,
2009).
If cost is a primary consideration, the best solution might not be an
SRO. A recent study, sponsored by groups opposing an SRO, concluded
that the cost of an SRO model ($550–$610 million annually) is twice as
high as the cost to fund a robust SEC examination program ($240–$270
million annually). A new non-FINRA SRO would be even more expensive
to administer, $610–$670 million annually (Boston Consulting Group,
2011). Regardless of the cost, resolution of the SRO issue is critical to the
harmonization debate, especially if the SRO is to be FINRA, which has been
regulating broker-dealers for many years, previously through the NASD,
but has little or no experience regulating advisers.
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Conclusion
Broker-dealers and investment advisers regularly provide advice and rec-
ommendations to investors who often know little about the stocks, bonds,
and mutual funds in which they invest. Investors entrust these securities
professionals with trillions of dollars of assets, and their futures often
depend on the ability of these professionals to meet clients’ needs. Not-
withstanding the importance placed on financial advisers, most ordinary
investors know little about the differences between them. Are they obliged
to act in our best interest or merely to determine whether an investment is
suitable? Are they selling securities from the firms’ own accounts or pairing
us with other traders in the market?
Since the 1930s, brokers and advisers have differentiated themselves
largely by the way they were compensated. This difference, however, has
eroded as brokers have begun to charge asset-based fees, and many brokers
now hold themselves out as advisers, causing further confusion as to their
roles and responsibilities. As a result, regulators are grappling with pro-
posals to harmonize the regulation of brokers and advisers and place a
uniform standard of care on both. Although few would disagree that a
uniform standard is a good idea in principle, regulators also must guard
against imposing new duties and obligations that would disrupt market
liquidity.
The debate over harmonization has evolved since the late 1990s when
the SEC first tackled the problem in its proposed rule. The SEC’s approach
began with a deregulatory philosophy, proposing to expand the brokers’
exclusion in the Advisers Act. This initial attempt was vacated by the courts.
Congress required further study in the Dodd-Frank Act, and, in its study,
the SEC’s position seems to have evolved to a more regulatory view, which
would impose heightened duties on brokers. Three other developments
have transformed the debate over harmonization. When fashioning a
proposed rule, the SEC must now be sensitive to increased demands for
an empirically based cost–benefit analysis to support the initiative. The SEC
must work closely with the DOL, which is seeking to fashion a new fiduciary
duty of its own. A DOL rule would likely be applicable to many firms
regulated by the SEC. Finally, the SEC must be mindful of calls for an
SRO for investment advisers, under which FINRA or a new SRO would be
the first-line regulator of advisers, much like FINRA is for brokers. These
three developments will shape the politics and the substance of the debate
over harmonization in the months and years to come.
The author received helpful comments from Brian Baltz, Dana Muir,
and John Turner. He is also grateful to David Clark and David Falk for
excellent research assistance.
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Table 13.1 Financial information for broker-dealers (1969–2010) [N]
Year Pre-tax income
($ millions)
Total revenues
($ millions)
Profit margin
(%)
2005 [A] 21,184.10 332,501.10 6.4
2004 [A] 23,188.90 242,929.60 9.5
2003 [A] 25,655.40 218,956.00 11.7
2002 [A] 15,262.00 221,811.00 6.9
2001 [A] 19,396.90 280,095.80 6.9
2000 [B] 39,103.30 349,493.30 11.2
1999 [B] 29,116.30 266,809.40 10.9
1998 [B] 17,184.20 234,964.40 7.3
1997 [B] 19,964.00 207,244.70 9.6
1996 [B] 16,978.50 172,411.50 9.8
1995 [C] 11,325.10 143,414.00 7.9
1994 [C] 3,492.20 112,758.10 3.1
1993 [C] 13,038.60 108,843.70 12.0
1992 [C] 9,116.60 90,584.00 10.1
1991 [D] 8,655.90 84,889.50 10.2
1990 [D] 790.10 71,356.20 1.1
1989 [D] 2,822.90 76,864.00 3.7
1988 [D] 3,477.30 66,100.40 5.3
1987 [E] 3,209.90 66,104.40 4.9
1986 [E] 8,301.20 64,423.80 12.9
1985 [E] 6,502.40 49,844.30 13.0
1984 [E] 2,856.60 39,607.10 7.2
1983 [F] 5,206.80 36,904.10 14.1
1982 [G] 4,073.00 28,801.00 14.1
1981 [H] 2,789.00 24,372.00 11.4
1980 [I] 3,053.00 19,984.00 15.3
1979 [J] 1,652.00 13,957.00 11.8
1978 [K] 1,072.00 11,273.00 9.5
1977 [L] 682.00 8,602.00 7.9
1976 [M] 1,505.00 8,915.00 16.9
1975 [M] 1,120.00 7,373.00 15.2
Notes :
[A]–[E] From 1989 to 2011, the SEC Annual Reports’ Pre-tax Income and Total Revenue was
consistently recorded for preceding years. However, in all Annual Reports, the most recent
year (and in some cases, years) was a preliminary projection. Thus, all data from 1984 to 2010
was obtained from SEC Annual Reports in subsequent years where such data was not noted as a
preliminary projection.
[E]–[M] From 1975 to 1984, reported data varied from yearly reports due to preliminary
projections and revisions. Thus, data was obtained from the most recent SEC Annual Report
available which reported the noted year’s data.
[N] ‘The Commission on June 28, 1968, adopted Rule 17a-10 under the Securities Exchange
Act, which requires exchange members and broker-dealers to file annual income and expense
reports with the Commission or with a registered self-regulatory organization which will
transmit the reports to the Commission. The rule will become effective on January 1, 1969,
and the first reports, which will be due in 1970, will cover the calendar year 1969.’ See 34 SEC
Annual Report 14–15 (1968).
(Continued)
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Endnotes
1. Certain firms are dually registered as broker-dealers and investment advisers,
and certain individuals are registered as both broker-dealer registered represen-
tatives and investment adviser representatives, leading to some overlap in the
numbers.
2. Investment discretion is legal authority, similar to authority granted under a
power of attorney, to trade on a customer’s behalf without obtaining the cus-
tomer’s prior approval (Cox et al., 2009).
3. Section 913(g)(1) amends the Securities Exchange Act to permit the SEC to
adopt rules providing that a broker-dealer must comply with the standard of care
imposed on advisers under Section 211 of the Advisers Act. In addition,
Section 913(g)(2) amends Section 211 of the Advisers Act to give the SEC
authority to require that the standard of care for brokers, dealers, and advisers,
is to act in their customers’ ‘best interest.’ Section 913(g)(2) also amends
Section 211 of the Advisers Act so that the new rules would provide that the
Sources:
[A] Selected SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2006, Table 7: Unconsolidated Financial Infor-
mation for Broker-Dealers, at 22 (available at http://sec.gov/about/secstats2006.pdf)
[B] SEC Annual Report: 2001, Table 5: Unconsolidated Financial Information for Broker-
Dealers, at 159 (available at http://sec.gov/pdf/annrep01/ar01full.pdf)
[C] SEC Annual Report: 1997, Table 12: Unconsolidated Financial Information for Broker-
Dealers, at 192 (available at http://sec.gov/about/annual_report/1997.pdf)
[D] SEC Annual Report: 1993, Table 12: Unconsolidated Financial Information for Broker-
Dealers, at 134 (available at http://sec.gov/about/annual_report/1993.pdf)
[E] SEC Annual Report: 1989, Table 1: Unconsolidated Financial Information for Broker-
Dealers, at 121 (available at http://sec.gov/about/annual_report/1989.pdf)
[F] SEC Annual Report: 1988, Table 1: Unconsolidated Financial Information for Broker-
Dealers, at 131 (available at http://sec.gov/about/annual_report/1988.pdf)
[G] SEC Annual Report: 1987, Table 1: Unconsolidated Financial Information for Broker-
Dealers, at 104 (available at http://sec.gov/about/annual_report/1987.pdf)
[H] SEC Annual Report: 1986, Table 1: Unconsolidated Financial Information for Broker-
Dealers, at 107 (available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1986.pdf)
[I] SEC Annual Report: 1985, Table 1: Unconsolidated Financial Information for Broker-
Dealers, at 92 (available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1985.pdf)
[J] SEC Annual Report: 1984, Table 1: Unconsolidated Financial Information for Broker-
Dealers, at 84 (available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1984.pdf)
[K] SEC Annual Report: 1983, Table 1: Unconsolidated Financial Information for Broker-
Dealers, at 72 (available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1983.pdf)
[L] SEC Annual Report: 1982, Table 1: Unconsolidated Financial Information for Broker-
Dealers, at 74 (available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1982.pdf)
[M] SEC Annual Report: 1981, Table 1: Financial Information for Broker-Dealers, at 98
(available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1981.pdf)
Table 13.1 Continued
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standard of conduct be no less stringent than the standard applicable to advisers
under Section 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act.
4. The statute required the study to be conducted by the Commission. The January
2011 study was authored by the SEC staff, not the Commission itself, and the
study contains a disclaimer stating that the Commission expressed no view
regarding the analysis, findings, or conclusion.
5. The other signatories are the Association for Advanced Life Underwriting, the
Financial Services Institute, the National Association for Fixed Annuities, the
National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, the Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association, and the Insured Retirement Institute.
6. The states retain authority to regulate both brokers and advisers in some
respects. The scope of state regulation is beyond the scope of this chapter.
7. As of 2008, fewer than 1 percent of advisory firms accounted for more than half
of approximately $40 trillion in discretionary assets managed by these advisers
(Tittsworth, 2009).
8. This study, issued under Section 914 of Dodd-Frank, should not be confused
with the study on the issue of a fiduciary duty for brokers issued under
Section 913 of the Act.
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